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A REGULATING AND WATCHFUL LAW: OIL 
AND GAS CONSERVATION LAW & THE NORTH 
DAKOTA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
GRAYSON P. WALKER 
 
The Oil and Gas Industry is a composite of production, 
transportation, refining and marketing operations. Of these four 
independent and interrelated operations, production—the 
searching for and the producing of oil and gas—is, when left 
unfettered, the most susceptible to wasteful practices and 
blustering confusion. For these reasons the production of oil and 
gas has not been left unfettered; it has been tied to a regulating 
and watchful law, the oil and gas conservation law of the several 
states.1 
  
                                                                                                                 
 *  B.A., Southern Methodist University; M.A., Knox Theological Seminary. The 
author is a third-year student at the University of Oklahoma College of Law and the 
grandson of Barth P. Walker. It is to Barth’s memory that the author dedicates this piece. 
The author thanks Professors Joseph R. Dancy and J. David Hampton for introducing him t o 
the law of oil and gas, which the author’s family knows and loves. He also thanks the editors 
of the Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal as well as his colleagues on the 
editorial staff of the Oklahoma Law Review. His greatest debt, however, is, as always, to his 
family and friends. 
 1. Barth P. “Jiggs” Walker, Discussion: A Model Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 26 
TUL. L. REV. 267 (1952). For more on Walker’s life and legacy, including his 2001 receipt of 
the University of Oklahoma College of Law’s Eugene O. Kuntz Award, see Barth P. 
“Jiggs” Walker, THE OKLAHOMAN (Jan. 2, 2006), https://legacy.newsok.com/obituaries/ 
oklahoman/obituary.aspx?n=barth-p-walker-jiggs&pid=16200273&f hid=. 
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Introduction 
Although the oil and gas industry that esteemed Oklahoma City oil and 
gas attorney Barth P. Walker knew and loved has changed dramatically in 
the more than fifty years since he penned the above paragraph, the same 
watchful regulatory law—the oil and gas conservation law of the several 
states—continues to govern production of oil and gas to a large extent. This 
Article aims to become a resource for scholars and practitioners interested 
in the history and application of oil and gas conservation law, especially in 
the State of North Dakota, one of today’s most prolific oil and gas 
producing states.2 Part I provides a cursory review of the history of oil and 
gas conservation law and the basic principles on which oil and gas 
conservation law stands. Part II takes a meticulous look at the North Dakota 
Industrial Commission (“NDIC”), the primary oil and gas regulatory body 
to which the State of North Dakota’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act gave 
birth. In Part III, rubber meets road, and the Article analyzes three areas of 
North Dakota oil and gas law before explaining how an appraisal of likely 
impacts on waste prevention and correlative rights by the regulators, 
legislators, and judges involved in the process might generate different—
and perhaps better—outcomes. 
I. Oil and Gas Conservation Law & the Foundational 
Principles on Which It Stands 
A. The Rule of Capture & Its Consequences 
“The evolution of [oil and gas] conservation laws,” writes Walker, “is a 
story unto itself.”3 This story has been told many times, but it deserves to be 
told again. It dates from the time of the Oklahoma Land Run4 and begins 
with the oft-cited case of Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. 
DeWitt.5 In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced the so-
called rule of capture, which would be followed and adopted by many 
courts, eventually becoming “universally recognized as the fundamental 
basis for the adjudication of property rights in oil and gas.”6 The DeWitt 
court’s language is familiar to all students of oil and gas law: 
                                                                                                                 
 2. E.g., Rankings: Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 2019), 
https:// www.eia.gov/state/rankings/#/series/46 (last accessed July 18, 2019). 
 3. Walker, supra note 1, at 267. 
 4. See, e.g., KATHLYN BALDWIN, THE 89ERS: OKLAHOMA LAND RUSH OF 1889 (1981). 
 5. 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889). 
 6. Barth P. Walker, Recent Developments in Pooling and Unitization, 6 INST. ON OIL & 
GAS L. & TAX’N 47, 48 (1955). Despite the DeWitt court holding’s important place in the 
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Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by 
themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals ferae 
naturae. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, 
they have the power and the tendency to escape without the 
volition of the owner . . . . They belong to the owner of the land 
and are part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject 
to his control; but when they escape and go into other land, or 
come under another’s control, the title of the former owner is 
gone.7 
Not long after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s announcement in DeWitt, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio solidified the rule of capture in a case involving 
a landowner’s attempt to enjoin the drilling of a well on his neighbor’s land, 
just across his property line. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to enjoin 
the drilling of the well, remarking: 
While it is generally supposed that oil is drained into wells for a 
distance of several hundred feet, this matter is somewhat 
uncertain, and no right of sufficient weight can be founded upon 
such uncertain supposition, to overcome the well[-]known right 
which every man has to use his property as he pleases, so long as 
he does not interfere with the legal rights of others. Protection of 
lines or adjoining lands by the drilling of wells on both sides of 
such lines affords an ample and sufficient remedy for the 
supposed grievances complained of in the petition . . . .8 
The rule, or law, of capture remains in force today,9 but various legal 
devices have been developed in order to counteract the rule’s detrimental 
consequences, like the wasteful practices associated with racing to get oil 
                                                                                                                 
history of oil and gas law, “[t]hat case cast one of the beginning links in the chain of legal 
precedents on which waste practitioners were nurtured.” Walker, supra note 1, at 271. 
 7. DeWitt, 18 A. at 725. 
 8. Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897). 
 9. E.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008) (“The 
rule of capture is a cornerstone of the oil and gas industry and is fundamental both to 
property rights and to state regulation.”); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Tomlinson, 859 P.2d 
1088, 1096 (Okla. 1993) (“The law of capture, under which oil and gas is owned by the one 
lawfully reducing it to possession, still obtains in Oklahoma.”) (internal citation omitted); 
Halbouty v. R.R. Comm’n, 357 S.W.2d 364, 375 (Tex. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 
(1962) (“[T]he rule of capture can mean little more than that due to their fugitive nature, the 
hydrocarbons when captured belong to the owner of the well to which they flowed, 
irrespective of where they may have been in place originally, without liability to his 
neighbor for drainage.”). 
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and gas out of the ground. “The ultimate in such legal devices,” writes 
Walker, “is the modern oil and gas conservation law which . . . seek[s] to 
prevent wasteful production of oil and gas and to protect the correlative 
rights of the various interested owners.”10 The prevention of waste and the 
protection of the correlative rights of owners of mineral interests in a 
common source of supply still stand at the center of state regulatory 
regimes, including North Dakota’s.11 To accomplish these twin goals, most 
state conservation law “provid[es] for, among other things, the establishing 
of drilling and spacing units, the proration of oil and gas production, and 
the operation of the entire oil and gas common sources of supply as a 
unit.”12 
B. Oil and Gas “Conservation” Law & the Creation of the Interstate Oil 
Compact Commission 
Before diving headfirst into the details of oil and gas conservation law, it 
is worth noting what is meant by conservation in the context of the oil and 
gas industry. Modernly, the notion of “conservation”—at least in most 
contexts—connotes efforts to protect or prevent the loss of something, like 
a wildlife population. Even popular dictionaries, like Merriam-Webster’s, 
defines “conservation” as a transitive verb meaning “to keep in a safe or 
sound state.”13 In this case, neither the connotative nor the denotative 
meanings of conservation are helpful because something else is meant. In 
the context of the oil and gas industry, “conservation is not saving by 
withholding from use, but is rather, under certain methods and in certain 
manners, production for use.”14 So while the goal of oil and gas 
conservation law is conservation, it is not the kind of conservation groups 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Walker, supra note 6, at 49. 
 11. E.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 910 P.2d 966, 970 (Okla. 1994) 
(explaining that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s jurisdiction empowers it to 
protect “public rights,” including the prevention of waste and the protection of correlative 
rights). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-01; Slawson v. NDIC, 339 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 
1983) (“The purposes of pooling are to prevent the physical and economic waste that 
accompany the drilling of unnecessary wells and to protect the correlative rights of 
landowners over a reservoir.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 12. Walker, supra note 1, at 270. 
 13. Conservation, M ERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/conserve (last accessed July 19, 2019). 
 14. Walker, supra note 1, at 270 (emphasis added). 
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fighting to protect or prevent the loss of something, like a wildlife 
population, have in view.15 
It was against the backdrop of this understanding of “conservation” that 
oil and gas conservation law, and the corresponding state regulatory bodies, 
first emerged. In particular, oil and gas conservation law, and the 
corresponding state regulatory bodies, emerged in response to the 
detrimental consequences of the rule of capture as explained in DeWitt and 
Kelley, like the wasteful practices associated with racing to get oil and gas 
out of the ground. In 1935, U.S. Congress got involved “in order 
constitutionally to pave the way so that the states cooperatively could help 
solve their separate problems in respect to oil and gas production.”16 
Congress paved the way by passing a resolution that eventually led to the 
creation of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (“IOCC”),17 whose 
Legal Committee began drafting model oil and gas conservation provisions 
not long after the IOCC’s creation.18 Many oil and gas producing states’ 
conservation laws, including North Dakota’s, have their roots in the IOCC’s 
1950 Model Act,19 so it is to that Model Act—and the principles that 
undergird it—that this Article now turns. 
The IOCC’s 1950 Model Act opened with a policy declaration that set 
forth the ends the Model Act sought to obtain. Although the policy 
declaration is long and rather technical, it appears below in full, primarily 
because its importance in shaping the oil and gas conservation law of the 
several states, including North Dakota’s, cannot be overstated. After all, the 
IOCC declaration appears, in full or in part, in at least twenty-five (25) oil 
                                                                                                                 
 15. E.g., Wildlife Conservation, WORLD WILDLIFE FOUND., https://www.worldwildlife. 
org/initiatives/wildlife-conservation (last accessed July 19, 2019). But see David E. Pierce, 
Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development by Maximizing 
Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 764 n.18 (2009) (“Even the term 
‘conservation’ regulation has a somewhat checkered past. The term ‘conservation’ was 
chosen because it sounds much better than state-sanctioned ‘price-fixing.’”). 
 16. Walker, supra note 1, at 267. 
 17. See State Oil and Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water Resources , U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY (May 2009), https://www.energyindepth.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2009/03/oil-and-gas-regulation-report-final-with-cover-5-27-20091.pdf (“In 1991, 
the organization changed its name to the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission 
(IOGCC).”). 
 18. Walker, supra note 1, at 268. 
 19. Kemp Wilson, Conservation Acts and Correlative Rights: Has the Pendulum Swung 
Too Far?, 35 ROCKY M TN. M IN. L. INST. 18 (1989). 
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and gas producing states’ conservation statutes.20 Moreover, the Model 
Act’s policy declaration really brings to life the oil and gas industry’s 
notion of conservation—that conservation is not so much about saving by 
withholding from use but rather production for use: 
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest to foster, to 
encourage, and to promote the development, production, and 
utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state in such 
a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for 
the operation and development of oil and gas properties in such a 
manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas be had and 
that the correlative rights of all owners be fully protected; and to 
encourage, to authorize, and to provide for cycling, re-cycling, 
pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery operations in 
order that the greatest possible economic recovery of oil and gas 
be obtained within the state to the end that the land owners, the 
royalty owners, the producers, and the general public realize and 
enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital natural 
resources.21 
C. Preventing Waste & Protecting Correlative Rights 
Oil and gas, despite the ostensible rising tide of controversy surrounding 
them,22 remain critical to our civilization.23 This reality, in conjunction with 
the fact that oil and gas do not reproduce themselves, means “these valuable 
resources must be conserved.”24 Once again, however, conserving oil and 
gas does not mean withholding from use; instead, conserving oil and gas 
means production for use in accordance with the principles enumerated in 
                                                                                                                 
 20. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-502; ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-101; CAL. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 34-60-102; M ISS. CODE ANN. § 53-1-1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 87.7; W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-1.  
 21. A Form for an Oil and Gas Conservation Statute, INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT 
COMM’N (May 5, 1950), in Walker, supra note 1, at 270 (emphases original). This paragraph 
appears almost verbatim at the outset of North Dakota’s oil and gas conservation law. See 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-01. 
 22. E.g., Marco Grasso, Oily Politics: A Critical Assessment of the Oil and Gas 
Industry’s Contribution to Climate Change, 50 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 106 (Apr. 2019); 
Christina Nunez, How Has Fracking Changed Our Future?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/energy/great-energy-challenge/big-
energy-question/how-has-fracking-changed-our-future/ (last accessed July 19, 2019). 
 23. E.g., What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3. 
 24. Walker, supra note 1, at 269. 
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the IOCC’s declaration of policy. Chief among the principles from which 
states were encouraged to draw in the establishment of a regulatory 
framework for the responsible and efficient production of oil and gas, 
declared the IOCC, were (1) the prevention of waste and (2) the protection 
of the correlative rights of owners. 
An unabated race to get oil and gas out of the ground, the natural 
byproduct of the rule of capture, led to overproduction and needless 
waste.25 In time, “those who had been destroyed or threatened with 
destruction by wasteful production practices” began wondering whether 
there was a way to promote conservation and protect landowners’ property 
rights simultaneously.26 Turns out, there was: an unabashed commitment to 
production for use. “[P]roduction for use,” argues Walker, “is the very 
antithesis of waste,”27 which explains why by the late nineteenth century 
states began enacting laws aimed at the prevention of waste and wasteful 
production. Early on, state conservation laws were written so as to prevent 
just one kind of waste: above ground. Such a limited approach to waste 
prevention became the industry standard, however, because “all of the 
waste that was known actually to be occurring was physical and visible.”28 
This limited understanding led states to pass statutes designed to “prevent 
fires, escape of oil and gas from the well, wasteful burning of oil and gas, 
and improper plugging of wells.”29  
By the early twentieth century, significant improvements in the 
understanding of petroleum engineering and underground reservoir 
conditions contributed to the emergence of a multi-faceted approach to 
waste prevention. The State of Oklahoma, which was in the vanguard of oil 
and gas conservation law—and often still is—acted first. By 1915, 
Oklahoma lawmakers had provided legislatively for the prevention not just 
of above-ground waste but also economic, underground, and surface waste, 
as well as “waste incident to the production of crude oil or petroleum in 
excess of transportation or marketing facilities or reasonable market 
                                                                                                                 
 25. E.g., id. at 278–79 (“Over-production—production in excess of transportation or 
marketing facilities, necessitating expensive storage, or in excess of reasonable market 
demand—once threatened to destroy the very existence of the oil and gas industry.”); Sidney 
J. Strong, Application of the Doctrine of Correlative Rights by the State Conservation 
Agency in the Absence of Express Statutory Authorization, 28 M ONT. L. REV. 205, 208 
(1967) (“[U]nfettered competition had no place for prudent means of production.”). 
 26. Walker, supra note 1, at 271. 
 27. Id. at 270. 
 28. Id. at 272. 
 29. Id. 
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demand.”30 The IOCC’s 1950 Model Act mirrored Oklahoma law in that it 
provided for a multi-faceted approach to waste prevention that began with, 
and subsequently built upon, the foundation which Oklahoma had laid 
thirty-five (35) years before. Other oil and gas producing states, including 
North Dakota, adopted many of the Model Act’s provisions, but they 
“tinkered in varying degrees with both concepts and specific provisions.”31 
The oil and gas industry’s understanding of petroleum engineering and 
underground reservoir conditions has vastly improved during the more than 
one hundred and fifty (150) year history of the industry. This improvement 
in understanding is largely attributable to the role of technology, which 
has—and continues—to drive the U.S. oil and gas industry forward.32 New 
technologies have been deployed throughout the industry, in its upstream, 
midstream, and downstream sectors; however, perhaps no sector of the 
industry has been more effected by technological advancement than the 
upstream sector, which for years was hamstrung by scientific and 
technological limitations.33 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. 
 31. Wilson, supra note 18, no page. See discussion infra Parts II and III for more on 
North Dakota’s oil and gas conservation law and its creation, interpretation, and application. 
 32. E.g., New Oil and Gas Production Technologies, STRAUSS CTR., UNIV. OF TEX. AT 
AUSTIN, https://www.strausscenter.org/energy-and-security/new-oil-and-gas-production-
technologies.html (“New technologies in the oil and natural gas sectors have enabled the 
explosion of production growth in the United States.”) (last accessed July 22, 2019); David 
Blackmon, Technology Is a Huge Driver of the U.S. Oil and Gas Boom , FORBES (Mar. 25, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2019/03/25/technology -is-a-huge-
driver-of-the-u-s-oil-and-gas-boom/#10b77fc5ac5d (“The value of the role increasingly 
being played by the deployment of high technology in [the oil and gas] industry cannot be 
overstated.”) (last accessed July 19, 2019). 
 33. Hindsight has revealed that scientific and technological limitations contributed to 
the fascination with geologist M. King Hubbert’s predictions about “Peak Oil.” Although 
Hubbert’s predictions were relatively accurate regarding conventional oil reserves, he did 
not foresee the impacts of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, both of which are 
byproducts of scientific and technological innovation that have changed everything. See, 
e.g., Michael Lynch, What Ever Happened to Peak Oil?, FORBES (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellynch/2018/06/29/what-ever-happened-to-peak-oil/#63 
800560731a (“The oil industry has always been in a tug-of-war between depletion and 
knowledge. It takes endless effort and investment to renew and expand reserves. But 
resource limits are a phantom . . . . Repeatedly, the forecasts are revised with a higher and 
later peak . . . . These estimates of declining reserves and production are incurably wrong 
because they treat as a quantity what is really a dynamic process driven by growing 
knowledge.”) (internal citation omitted) (last accessed July 19, 2019); James Conca, No 
Peak Oil for America or the World, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jamesconca/2017/03/02/no-peak-oil-for-america-or-the-world/#6cb866d24220 (“Oil is 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/3
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 “[W]ells,” as Walker put it so long ago, “man’s contribution to the 
production enterprise, must be located, spaced, drilled, equipped, operated, 
and produced so as to take full advantage of the natural conditions 
encountered in the reservoir and of the reservoir fluids contained therein.”34 
While man’s contribution to the production enterprise necessarily must 
account for the natural conditions encountered in the reservoir and of the 
reservoir fluids contained therein, “the deployment of a raft of advancing 
technologies”35 has enabled upstream companies to maximize recoveries 
once never dreamed of—despite the natural conditions encountered in the 
reservoir and of the reservoir fluids contained therein.36 So while the 
establishing of drilling and spacing units, proration, and the operation of 
entire oil and gas common sources of supply as a unit remain indispensable 
parts of state conservation law and the regulatory frameworks to which they 
gave birth, technology has changed the game. State legislatures and 
regulatory bodies are still tasked with the prevention of waste, but doing so 
in today’s marketplace means accounting for a host of complexities not 
contemplated by the IOCC’s Model Act.37 
The IOCC’s Model Act sought to do more than simply provide states 
with a set of model provisions for the prevention of waste from which they 
could pick and choose; it also sought to provide states with “a better rule 
than self-help” for the protection of property rights.”38 This “better rule” is 
                                                                                                                 
more plentiful than you can imagine. And we keep figuring out easier and more economical 
ways to get it out of the ground.”); Monika U. Ehrman, Lights Out in the Bakken: A Review 
and Analysis of Flaring Regulation and Its Potential Effect on North Dakota Shale Oil 
Production, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (2014) (“The prolific escalation of activity in the 
Bakken is due to the relatively recent technological combination of horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing . . . .”); Larry Hughes & Jacinda Rudolph, Future World Oil 
Production: Growth, Plateau, or Peak?, 3 CURRENT OP . ENVT’L SUSTAIN. 225 (2011).  
 34. Walker, supra note 1, at 276 (emphasis added). 
 35. Blackmon, supra note 32. 
 36. See, e.g., Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History 
of an Enduring Technology, 62 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 26, 27 (2010) (“Since Stanolind Oil 
introduced hydraulic fracturing in 1949, close to 2.5 million fracture treatments have been 
performed worldwide. Some believe that approximately 60% of all wells drilled today are 
fractured. Fracture stimulation not only increases the production rate, but is credited with 
adding to reserves—9 bbl of oil and more than 700 Tscf of gas . . . which otherwise would 
have been uneconomical to develop.”). 
 37. Scientific and technological advancement have contributed to the need for change at 
state legislatures and regulatory bodies, but a deep dive into that issue is beyond the scope of 
this Article—although it deserves to be explored elsewhere. 
 38. Walker, supra note 1, at 279. See also Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 
A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907) (discussing the classic statement of the self-help rule, where an 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
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the doctrine of correlative rights, which is part and parcel of the larger 
legislative and regulatory framework of conservation law, especially the 
parts dealing with the establishing of drilling and spacing units. Drilling and 
spacing units serve three primary purposes: they (1) prevent waste; (2) 
prevent the drilling of a greater number of wells than is necessary, which 
can impact the ultimate recovery from a reservoir, and (3) protect 
correlative rights. 
Although the Model Act does not explicitly explain what a necessary or 
unnecessary well is, “it does require that ‘the size and the shape of spacing 
units are to be such as will result in the efficient and economical 
development of the pool as a whole, and the size shall not be smaller than 
the maximum area that can be efficiently drained by one well.’”39 What 
constitutes efficient and economical development of a pool is case specific, 
which means “the size of the spacing unit will depend upon the facts and 
circumstances disclosed by the evidence presented to the regulatory 
body.”40 Generally, however, the development plan for a pool ought to be 
patterned so that wells are located in units “which have enough oil or gas 
thereunder . . . sufficient to net a return adequate to pay at least the cost of: 
(1) drilling; (2) completing []; (3) producing; (4) operating; (5) finding new 
reserves []; and (6) a reasonable profit.”41  
Providing for the protection of correlative rights, which guarantee to 
“[e]ach owner [the] co-equal opportunity to produce oil or gas from [a] 
pool,”42 is necessary because of the connected nature of reservoir rock: 
“any owner conducting operations within [a] reservoir [can] impact other 
owners.”43 The potential for adverse impact on a reservoir in turn gives rise 
to “extra-territorial rights . . . in each owner in the reservoir.”44 Washburn 
University School of Law Professor David E. Pierce explains the extra-
territorial element of correlative rights this way: 
If A is engaging in acts totally within the boundaries of A’s 
property, but the activity negatively impacts the reservoir in 
some way, B and others owning rights in the reservoir may be 
able to enjoin A to protect their property interests in the 
                                                                                                                 
owner’s only protection from drainage on other lands is to “do likewise” by drilling wells on 
his own lands). 
 39. Walker, supra note 1, at 281. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 282 (reformatted for brevity). 
 42. Id. at 283. 
 43. Pierce, supra note 15, at 768. 
 44. Id. 
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reservoir. Similarly, B may have the affirmative right to impact 
A’s property to the extent it positively impacts the reservoir in 
some way. This second observation may appear to be a bit 
radical, but it is the logical corollary of the first principle. Parties 
owning property in a reservoir must be cognizant of the rights of 
all parties to effectively maximize their rights in the reservoir, so 
long as they do not injure the reservoir. This prevents parties 
from trying to artificially fence off their connected tract when 
they do not agree with what is best for the collective owners of 
the reservoir.45 
In a word, no single owner has exclusive rights over a reservoir. Instead, 
ownership of lands overlying a reservoir create “cotenant-like 
relationship[s]” between and among owners, and each owner’s behavior is 
evaluated for appropriateness in relation to the rest of the so-called 
reservoir community.46  
The IOCC set forth model provisions to serve as a foundation on which 
states could build their own oil and gas conservation law,47 and the IOGCC 
continues this important work today.48 Although some states tinkered with 
the IOCC’s Model Act provisions more than others, each oil and gas 
producing state’s statutes today include provisions that provide for the 
prevention of waste and the protection of correlative rights, usually through 
the establishment of drilling and spacing units by a state regulatory body.49 
It is to the details of one set of oil and gas conservation law—and the 
regulatory body to which it gave birth—that this Article now turns. 
II. The North Dakota Industrial Commission & Its Legislative Mandate 
In North Dakota, the body tasked with the administration and 
enforcement of much of the state’s regulatory apparatus is the NDIC. The 
NDIC conducts and manages an abundance of “utilities, industries, 
enterprises, and business projects established by state law,”50 and it does so 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. at 768–69 (internal citation omitted). 
 46. Id. at 771; cf. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 120 (1987). 
 47. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 17. 
 48. See Pierce, supra note 15, at 766. 
 49. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 17. 
 50. About the Commission, NDIC, http://www.nd.gov/ndic/ic-about.htm (“The 
Legislature created the Industrial Commission of North Dakota (the ‘Commission’) in 1919 
to conduct and manage, on behalf of the State, certain utilities, industries, enterprises and 
business projects established by state law. The members of the Commission are the 
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under its own “rules and regulations.”51 One of the many industries under 
the NDIC’s management is the oil and gas industry. The administration and 
enforcement of the laws governing the oil and gas industry, at least related 
to oil and gas conservation, falls upon the NDIC’s Department of Mineral 
Resources and its Oil and Gas Division,52 to which the North Dakota State 
Legislature granted broad and “continuing jurisdiction and authority over 
all persons and property, public and private, necessary to enforce 
effectively the provisions of [] chapter [38-08].”53 Chapter 38 of the North 
Dakota Century Code contains all of the State’s oil and gas conservation 
law,54 which empowers the NDIC to require, by way of illustration, a 
person to secure a permit before “commenc[ing] operations for the drilling 
of a well for oil or gas”55 and to “conduct investigations of all matters 
directly or indirectly connected with . . . any of the utilities, industries, 
enterprises, and business projects under its management.”56 
Like the IOCC’s 1950 Model Act, Chapter 38 begins with a “Declaration 
of Policy” that unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent behind the 
State’s oil and gas conservation law: “It is hereby declared to be in the 
public interest to foster, to encourage, and to promote the development, 
production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and gas . . . .”57 Not 
surprisingly, the basic principles on which North Dakota decided to build 
its oil and gas conservation law—i.e., the means by which the State planned 
to accomplish its overarching policy objectives—were the prevention of 
waste and the protection of correlative rights.58 In fact, the principles of 
                                                                                                                 
Governor, the Attorney General and the Agriculture Commissioner of the State.”) (last 
accessed July 19, 2019); see also N.D. CENT. CODE. § 54-17-01. 
 51. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 54-17-08. 
 52. See NDIC, supra note 50. 
 53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-04; cf. Black Hills Trucking, Inc. v. NDIC, 904 N.W.2d 
326, 330 (N.D. 2017). 
 54. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-08-01 to -23. Chapter 38 of the N.D. CENT. CODE is the 
codified version of the State’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act, which was enacted in 1953. 
See 1953 N.D. Laws 356-72. 
 55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05. 
 56. Id. § 54-17-16. For more on matters directly or indirectly connected with the 
NDIC’s jurisdiction and authority, see discussion infra Part II.B. 
 57. Id. § 38-08-01. As alluded to already, the State of North Dakota’s “Declaration of 
Policy” is an exact imprint of the IOCC’s declaration but for three words. For that reason, it 
has not been reproduced in detail here. For a refresher, see Strong, supra note 25, at 214 
(“Whatever the legal effect of a policy declaration, it does spell out the legislative purpose 
underlying the adoption of a particular law.”); cf. discussion supra Part I.B. 
 58. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-08-01 (declaration of policy), 38-08-03 (prohibition of 
waste), 38-08-07 (enabling the NDIC to establish spacing units to, among other things, 
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waste prevention and the protection of correlative rights were so firmly 
engrained in the minds of North Dakota legislators that North Dakota 
adopted an earlier version of the IOCC’s Model Act “nearly before the ink 
was dry . . ., adopting [the IOCC provisions] in toto during the 1941 
legislative session and at a time when there were no producing oil wells in 
the state!”59 The extent to which these foundational principles continue to 
shape the State’s public policy in the area of oil and gas conservation law is 
the subject of Part III. 
A. The NDIC: A Tale of Broad Jurisdiction & Authority 
As has been mentioned already, the North Dakota Legislature endowed 
the NDIC with broad jurisdiction and authority in the area of oil and gas 
conservation law.60 The NDIC’s jurisdiction and authority have been 
repeatedly affirmed before the State’s highest court—in cases involving 
both routine and irregular disputes. There is no doubt, for example, that the 
NDIC’s legislative mandate includes “comprehensive power[] to regulate 
oil and gas development,” including the right to establish spacing units or 
issue pooling orders.61 Despite the NDIC’s comprehensive power to issue 
                                                                                                                 
protect correlative rights). But see Pierce, supra note 15, at 763-64 (arguing that despite 
“major strides” to mitigate the damage caused by the rule of capture, promises of oil and gas 
conservation remain unfulfilled); cf. discussion supra Part I.A. 
 59. Pierce, supra note 15, at 767 n.32 (citations omitted). 
 60. For an anecdotal explanation of just how far-reaching the NDIC’s jurisdiction and 
authority are, see, e.g., EPA's Regulatory Activity During the Obama Administration: Energy 
and Industrial Sectors: Hearing Before the H. Subomm. On Energy and Power, 114th Cong. 
1 (2016) (statement of Lynn D. Helms, Director, North Dakota Industrial Commission, 
Department of Mineral Resources), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20160706/ 
105153/HHRG-114-IF03-Wstate-HelmsL-201607 06.pdf (“The North Dakota Industrial 
Commission . . . [has] jurisdiction over gathering pipelines, oil and gas spill reporting, and 
well site construction regulation of the drilling, production and plugging of wells; the 
restoration of drilling and production sites; the perforating and chemical treatment of wells, 
including hydraulic fracturing; the spacing of wells; operations to increase ultimate recovery 
and prevent waste, such as cycling of gas; the maintenance of pressure; and the introduction 
of gas, water, or other substances into producing formations; disposal of saltwater and oil 
field wastes through the North Dakota Underground Injection Control Program; restricting 
and reducing the flaring of natural gas associated with crude oil production; and many other 
operations related to the production of oil or gas and protection of the State of North 
Dakota’s industrial interests.”) 
 61. E.g., Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 616 N.W.2d 861, 865 (N.D. 2000); Cont’l Res., 
Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 846 (N.D. 1997); Slawson v. NDIC, 339 N.W.2d 
772 (N.D. 1983). For a brief articulation of the differences between pooling and spacing, see 
Egeland, 616 N.W.2d at 865 n.5: 
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such orders, NDIC orders are routinely challenged, especially when parties 
are convinced they have been uniquely wronged. North Dakota courts 
generally refrain from striking down NDIC orders, however, primarily 
because NDIC employees are treated as “qualified experts” against whose 
judgment courts will not substitute their own.62  
In Texaco, Inc. v. NDIC, for example, the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota upheld an NDIC pooling order which had been issued “retroactive 
to the date of first operations.”63 In that case, Texaco alleged that the 
NDIC’s issuance of a retroactive pooling order, which granted an ex post 
facto “share of the working interest in all of the oil and gas produced from 
Texaco’s own well located on Texaco’s solely owned leasehold” to an 
adjoining landowner, amounted to a confiscation of its property without due 
process of law.64 After a district court ruling in favor of the defendant, 
Texaco appealed.65 The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Texaco’s 
arguments.66 The court’s analysis was admittedly perfunctory; but perhaps 
that was because of the deferential standard which North Dakota courts 
apply when reviewing the decisions of state administrative agencies like the 
NDIC.67 Under state law, district courts tasked with reviewing NDIC orders 
apply a separate and special standard of review, which limits the traditional 
breadth of judicial review by requiring “affirmance ‘if the commission has 
regularly pursued its authority and its findings and conclusions are 
                                                                                                                 
Spacing and pooling are separate concepts. Amoco Production Co. v. [NDIC], 
307 N.W.2d 839, 849 (N.D.1981). A pool is a reservoir, or a common source of 
supply, and constitutes a common accumulation of oil or gas, or both. See N.D. 
ADMIN. CODE § 43–02–03–01(12) and (49). A spacing unit “is the area in each 
pool which is assigned to a well for drilling, producing, and proration purposes 
in accordance with the commission’s rules or orders.” N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43–
02–03–01(52). “A spacing order standing alone without a pooling order does 
not operate as a de facto pooling of all fractional interests under the 
drillsite . . . .” Schank v. North American Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419, 422 
(N.D. 1972). 
Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-08-04(1)(b)(3), 38-08-07, 38-08-08. 
 62. Texaco, Inc. v. NDIC, 448 N.W.2d 621, 624 (N.D. 1989) (“This court . . . has 
indicated its reluctance to substitute its own judgment for that of qualified experts in matters 
entrusted to administrative agencies.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 622. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 626. 
 67. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-01 to -52. 
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sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence.’”68 Even the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota “applies [this separate and special] 
standard of review in appeals from district court involving orders of the 
[NDIC].”69 This deferential standard, which turns on the court’s application 
of the so-called substantial evidence test, 
is something less than the greater weight of the evidence and the 
preponderance of the evidence tests, and differs from the usual 
standard of review for administrative decisions under [N.D. 
CENT. CODE] § 28-32-46. “Substantial evidence is such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion,” and we “accord greater deference to 
Industrial Commission findings of fact than we ordinarily accord 
to other administrative agencies’ findings of fact[,]” [although 
t]he Commission’s decisions on questions of law are fully 
reviewable on appeal.70 
Notwithstanding the courts’ aversion to overturning NDIC decisions, 
parties “adversely affected by an order of the commission” are nevertheless 
entitled to “file a petition for reconsideration with the agency” or “may 
appeal from such order to the district court of the county in which the land 
or a part thereof involved in the unit lies.”71  
North Dakota courts have defended the NDIC’s jurisdiction and 
authority in somewhat irregular disputes, too. In Black Hills Trucking, Inc. 
v. NDIC, for example, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed an NDIC 
order imposing “a $950,000 civil penalty . . . for illegally dumping 
saltwater on roads.”72 In that case, the NDIC issued an administrative 
complaint against Black Hills Trucking after multiple parties reported 
seeing Black Hills trucks “dumping substantial amounts of fluids onto 
roads” and “on[to] the ground.”73 Commission employees were dispatched 
to collect soil and fluid samples from the scenes of the dumping.74 Lab 
analysis indicated that the samples “contained elevated levels of electrical 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Texaco, 448 N.W.2d at 625; cf. Amoco Production Co. v. NDIC, 307 N.W.2d 839, 
841 (N.D.1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-14(3). 
 69. Black Hills, 904 N.W.2d at 330. 
 70. Id. (internal citaton omitted). 
 71. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-40, 38-08-09.16. 
 72. Black Hills, 904 N.W.2d at 328. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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conductivity and chlorides consistent with saltwater.”75 During the NDIC 
evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge “recommended that the 
complaint against Black Hills be dismissed with prejudice[, but] the 
Commission . . . approved an alternative decision by unanimous vote 
finding that Black Hills violated [] regulations.”76 On appeal, both the 
district and Supreme Courts affirmed the NDIC order and rejected Black 
Hills’ claims that the NDIC lacked jurisdiction, imposed an 
“unconstitutionally excessive fine,” and violated basic notions of 
“fundamental fairness.”77  
In a word, the NDIC is legislatively endowed with comprehensive 
jurisdiction and authority to regulate the oil and gas industry—including the 
right to establish spacing units, issue pooling orders, or regulate the 
disposal of saltwater and other oilfield wastes—and the State’s courts are 
wont to overturn NDIC decisions or otherwise limit the scope of its 
jurisdiction and authority. 
B. Preventing Waste & Protecting Correlative Rights in North Dakota 
In North Dakota, “[w]aste of oil and gas is prohibited.”78 The State 
Legislature has defined “waste” broadly to include: 
a. Physical waste, as that term is generally understood in the oil 
and gas industry. 
b. The inefficient, excessive, or improper use of, or the 
unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy. 
c. The locating, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating, or 
producing of any oil or gas well or wells in a manner which 
causes, or tends to cause, reduction in the quantity of oil or gas 
ultimately recoverable from a pool under prudent and proper 
operations, or which causes or tends to cause unnecessary or 
excessive surface loss or destruction of oil or gas. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 329. 
 76. Id. at 329-30. 
 77. Id. at 330, 333, 335. For more on the overlapping jurisdiction of the NDIC and the 
North Dakota Department of Health, see id. at 333 (“The [NDIC] acknowledges that the 
agencies’ jurisdiction over oilfield waste may overlap to some degree, but argues this 
situation is not prohibited under the law. . . . We conclude the Department [of Health] does 
not have primary jurisdiction over this oilfield waste matter and both the Department and the 
Commission could exercise their regulatory jurisdiction.”). 
 78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-03. 
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d. The inefficient storing of oil. 
e. The production of oil or gas in excess of transportation or 
marketing facilities or in excess of reasonable market demand.79 
As is true in the other oil and gas producing states, both North Dakota 
and the public at large have a “collective interest” in the prevention of 
waste which “is greater than that of any individual landowner.”80 It is on the 
basis of this collective interest that states like North Dakota “may make 
reasonable regulations designed to promote the ‘greatest ultimate economic 
recovery of the oil and gas from the earth.’”81 Reasonable regulations are 
those that “result . . . not [in] a hoarding of oil and gas in place, but rather a 
regulation of production.”82 In other words, North Dakota’s waste 
prevention statutes were written not so as to quash landowners’ ability to 
capture oil and gas but rather to ensure ultimate recovery by eliminating 
wasteful practices. This should not come as a surprise to readers familiar 
with the evolution of oil and gas conservation law because North Dakota 
relied upon the IOCC and the laws of other states when drafting its oil and 
gas conservation statutes.83  
Whereas waste prevention statutes have as their general goal the 
protection of valuable public resources, correlative rights statutes aim to 
spell out the duties and obligations of private landowners, one to another.84 
Protection of correlative rights is accomplished in multitudinous ways: 
some states have chosen to make the protection of correlative rights “a 
matter of public policy [by providing] statutory definitions of these rights” 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. § 38-08-02(19). 
 80. Strong, supra note 25, at 210; cf. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 
U.S. 210 (1932). 
 81. Strong, supra note 25, at 210. 
 82. Id.; cf. supra Part I.B (discussing “production for use,” or what is meant by 
conservation in the context of the oil and gas industry). 
 83. See, e.g., Report of the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee, N.D. LEGIS. 
39 & 43 (1953) (“This sub-committee thoroughly studied the laws of other states, model acts 
recommended by the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, and received advice and counsel 
from the state of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission and the tax and regulatory bodies 
of other states. . . . The Interstate Oil Compact Commission, representing the great majority 
of the oil producing states, under Act of Congress, has been a source of . . . the proposed 
conservation Act. It has been a source of great assistance in formulating the rules of the 
Industrial Commission and in preparing the proposed legislation. We believe it can be of 
great assistance in the future and we recommend that North Dakota join the compact.”); see 
also supra, Part I. 
 84. E.g., Strong, supra note 25, at 212. 
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while “[o]ther states do not explicitly define correlative rights, but do 
require each producer to be guaranteed his just and equitable share.”85 
Discovering the specific means by which a state has provided for the 
protection of correlative rights often requires a detailed legislative 
appraisal, but it’s worth the required time because “[t]he emphasis placed 
on and the method used in protecting correlative rights depends on whether 
the conservation legislation is primarily for the protection of these rights or 
for the preservation of oil and gas as a natural resource.”86 
North Dakota, like many oil and gas producing states, has ostensibly 
chosen to make the protection of correlative rights a matter of public policy, 
although it has not provided a specific statutory definition of these rights.87 
Even though North Dakota’s State Legislature has not provided a statutory 
definition of correlative rights, North Dakota courts have had ample 
opportunity to define correlative rights and interpret the State’s waste 
prevention statutes in the context of litigation dating back decades. It is to 
the treatment of these overarching policies and principles in the creation, 
interpretation, and application of North Dakota oil and gas law that this 
Article now turns. 
III. Evaluating the Creation, Interpretation & Application 
of North Dakota Oil and Gas Law 
The NDIC’s legislative mandate, at least as it relates to oil and gas 
conservation, endows the NDIC with a broad and continuing jurisdiction 
rooted in the foundational principles of waste prevention and the protection 
of correlative rights. As the platitude, “With great power, comes great 
responsibility” suggests, the NDIC—as well as the legislators and judges 
tasked with the creation, interpretation, and application of North Dakota 
law—ought to wield their powers responsibly. In this context, the 
responsible wielding of power means analyzing cases, laws, and rules with 
an eye to the State’s foundational oil and gas conservation principles; i.e., 
an appraisal of an outcome’s likely impacts on waste prevention and the 
protection of correlative rights. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been little, 
if any, substantive discussion or reference to these principles in the recent 
case law and legislative and administrative records. A brief discussion of 
pore space law, gas flaring regulation, and gas royalty litigation, as well as 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 213. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 213 n.45; cf. discussion Part I.B. 
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some of the consequences of ignoring the State’s foundational oil and gas 
principles, follows below.  
A. Pore Space Law 
“Pore space” is most easily conceived of as one of the many rights in the 
metaphorical “bundle of sticks” to which law students are introduced during 
their first-year Property course. Historically, however, debating about pore 
space has not been an important part of the practice or adjudication of oil 
and gas law. In fact, according to energy lawyer Trae Gray, “[u]ntil very 
recently, pore space was hardly considered a property right at all.”88 But 
things are different today.89  
Interest in carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), in addition to the 
need to store waste products born of horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing, means the basic definitions of pore space—e.g., “the empty 
space between grains of rock, fractures, and voids”90—no longer work.91 In 
response, state legislatures have begun codifying specific definitions of 
pore space. In North Dakota, for example, “‘pore space’ means a cavity or 
void, whether natural or artificially created, in a subsurface sedimentary 
stratum.”92 Oklahoma’s definition is even wordier than North Dakota’s: 
“‘pore space’ means any interstitial space not occupied by soil or rock, 
within the solid material of the earth, and any cavity, hole, hollow or void 
space within the solid material of the earth.”93 This may seem like a 
superfluous survey of state statutes, but it is not: regulators, legislators, and 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Trae Gray, A 2015 Analysis and Update on U.S. Pore Space Law—The Necessity of 
Proceeding Cautiously with Respect to the Stick Known as Pore Space, 1 OIL & GAS, NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 277, 280 (2015). 
 89. Amy Dalrymple, North Dakota Lawmakers’ Approval of ‘Pore Space’ Bill Might 
Result in Lawsuits, BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Apr. 17, 2019), https://bismarcktribune.com/ 
news/local/govt-and-politics/north-dakota-lawmakers-approval-of-pore-space-bill-might-
result/article_663098dd-b17d-5189-a35e-6e8423a03f9e.html; see also Tara Righetti, The 
Private Pore Space: Condemnation for Subsurface Ways of Necessity, 16 WYO. L. REV. 77, 
78 (2016) (“The question of pore space ownership has become a renewed topic of interest as  
technologies, such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, have resulted in greater 
penetration of the pore space. These technologies increase the possibility of subsurface 
trespass and other torts resulting from migrating fluids, proppants, and errant wellbores that 
deviate from their planned paths.”). 
 90. Gray, supra note 88, at 279. 
 91. See generally Blayne N. Grave, Carbon Capture and Storage in South Dakota, 55 
S.D. L. REV. 72 (2010) (providing an overview of pore space law in many states, including 
North Dakota). 
 92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-31-02. 
 93. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 6(B). 
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judges need to understand this emerging area of the law because it remains 
underdeveloped, and questions abound.94 
Although states like North Dakota and Oklahoma have enacted statutes 
addressing pore space ownership, these statutes are beginning to be tested 
in the courts. To industry insiders, this shouldn’t come as a surprise because 
“pore space has been recognized as having its own value for reinjection of 
produced substances, storage of non-native gasses, and for geologic carbon 
sequestration.”95 Pore space law also has the potential to undo two hundred 
and fifty (250) years of property law stemming from the ad coelum 
doctrine.96 In full, the maxim states “cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad 
coelum et ad infernos,” which means “to whomsoever the soil belongs, he 
owns also to the sky and to the depths.”97 This is lawyer-speak for 
whomever has title to a tract of land, has title to that tract from the sky 
above to the center of the earth.98 If the tract of land is owned in fee 
simple,99 “[d]etermining ownership of [the] pore space is very 
straightforward . . . because the fee owner holds title to both the surface 
estate and the mineral estate.”100 In mineral-rich states like North Dakota, 
however, the surface and mineral estates are often severed from one 
another, which complicates the process for determining pore space 
ownership.101 
                                                                                                                 
 94. For a list of largely unanswered questions in the area of pore space law, see Gray, 
supra note 88, at 280 (“Does it make sense for pore space to be a private property right? 
Does it make better sense for the government to own pore space? Should it be considered as 
part of the mineral estate? Or should it be a right of the surface estate? If it is determined that 
this resource is better owned by the government, is the takings clause implicated?”). 
 95. Righetti, supra note 89, at 78. 
 96. For more on the ad coelom doctrine, see John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of 
the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 980 (2008). 
 97. Id. at 980, 1007 n.182. 
 98. Of course, in reality, the ad coelum doctrine is no longer the law. The advent of 
airplanes, for example, altered the traditional view that an owner’s title truly extends into the 
heavens, and today courts are wont to permit landowners to bring claims for trespass and 
nuisance for airplanes flying over their property. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-12. The 
advent and growth of private drone use presents another problem, however. For more, see 
generally Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance, and Privacy 
Torts as Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359 (2017). 
 99. Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An interest in land that, 
being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies 
without heirs; esp., a fee simple absolute.”). 
 100. Gray, supra note 88, at 282. 
 101. See id. at 282-85 (discussing the two common ownership structures once the surface 
and mineral estates have been severed from one another). But see Barry Barton, The 
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In 2009, the North Dakota State Legislature enacted new pore space laws 
pursuant to Senate Bill 2139.102 These laws, passed in a preemptory fashion 
to address (and simplify) the process for determining pore space ownership 
in North Dakota, reveal the State Legislature’s intent to associate pore 
space ownership with “the overlying surface estate”103 and prevent the 
severing (but not the leasing) of pore space from the surface estate.104 Two 
recent cases in which North Dakota law was applied to analyze the facts 
provide at least some guidance on the present state of pore space law in 
North Dakota. 
In Fisher v. Continental Resources, Inc.,105 the federal District Court of 
North Dakota ruled that Continental “had the right to drill a saltwater 
disposal well within [its] unit to dispose of saltwater produced within the 
unit as it was reasonably associated with exploration and recovery 
efforts.”106 In that case, the surface owners, the Fishers, sued Continental 
for nuisance, trespass, fraudulent representation, and deceit, and they 
sought monetary damages, injection reports, and injunctive relief.107 The 
court began its discussion with an analysis of North Dakota property law, 
explaining that the mineral estate is dominant108 and includes “an implied 
right to use so much of the surface estate as is reasonably necessary to 
explore, develop, and transport the materials.”109  
Despite the mineral estate’s “dominance,” mineral developers’ actions 
are subject to a reasonableness test under the accommodation doctrine, 
which “requires a consideration of all the pertinent circumstances including 
what are the usual, customary, and reasonable practices in the industry, and 
the nature, condition, location, and current use of the servient estate.”110 
Ultimately, the court found that Continental “ha[d] a general right to 
                                                                                                                 
Common Law of Subsurface Activity: General Principle and Current Problems, in THE LAW 
OF ENERGY UNDERGROUND: UNDERSTANDING NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SUBSURFACE 
PRODUCTION, TRANSMISSION, AND STORAGE 21 (ed. 2014) (concluding there is no distinction 
between the two common ownership structures). 
 102. S.B. 2139, 61st Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2009), https://www.legis.nd.gov/ 
assembly/61-2009/bill-text/JQTB0100.pdf (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-3-01 to -09). 
 103. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-31-03 to -04. 
 104. Id. § 47-31-05. 
 105. 49 F. Supp. 3d 637 (D.N.D. 2014). 
 106. Gray, supra note 88, at 307-08 (emphasis added). 
 107. Fisher, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 640. 
 108. Id. at 641. 
 109. Mark D. Christiansen, Oil and Gas Litigation Update for the North Dakota State 
Courts, 90 N.D. L. REV. 267, 286 (2014). 
 110. Fisher, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 641. 
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conduct salt water disposal operations within [its u]nit,” but it declined to 
grant Continental’s motion for summary judgment because too many 
“genuine issues of material fact . . . remain[ed] disputed.”111  
In the wake of the court’s ruling, the Fishers made a motion to certify a 
question to the North Dakota Supreme Court: “Is pore space included 
within the term ‘surface owner’s land’ such that a surface owner may be 
entitled to damages for use that has resulted in ‘lost land value’ or ‘lost use 
of and access to the surface owner’s land’ within the meaning of N.D.C.C. 
§ 38-11.1-04?”112 The District of North Dakota court declined to certify the 
Fishers’ proposed question and concluded that “[t]he Court is capable of 
answering the question regarding pore space posed in this case based upon 
the relevant North Dakota case law and statutes.”113 The District of North 
Dakota issued a third order in this dispute on October 8, 2015.114 There, the 
court found not only that the term “land” as used in Section 38-11.1-04 
encompasses the pore space but also “that the language . . . [is] broad 
enough to encompass compensation for use of the surface owner’s pore 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Id. at 646-49, 648 n.3. Significantly, the court also declined to rule on whether the 
surface damages act encompassed damages for use of pore space. (“The North Dakota 
Supreme Court has not addressed whether Chapter 38-11.1 may be read to encompass 
compensation for use of pore space. . . . The express language of Section 38-11.1-04 requires 
compensation for all damage to the surface owner’s land. . . . Arguably, the pore space is a 
part of the surface owner’s land. The North Dakota Legislature has irrevocably tied the pore 
space estate to the surface estate in Chapter 47-31. Thus, a compelling argument can be 
made that the language and purpose of Chapter 38-11.1 are broad enough to encompass 
compensation for use of the pore space.”). 
 112. Fisher v. Cont’l Res., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-097, 2015 WL 11400078, at *2 (D.N.D. 
Sept. 14, 2015). 
 113. Id. Treading carefully here, there is at least an an aura of arrogance in the District of 
North Dakota’s denial of the Fisher’s motion to certify a question of state law to the North 
Dakota Supreme Court. After all, “[O]nly state courts can decide state law with finality; 
federal courts cannot bind state courts on state law. . . . [F]ederal courts must defer to state 
courts on their own state law.” John Burritt McArthur, Some Advice on Bice, North Dakota’s 
Marketable-Product Decision, 90 N.D. L. REV. 545, 556 (2014); cf. Mosser v. Denbury Res., 
898 N.W.2d 406, 410 (2017) (“[A state’s high c]ourt is the final arbitrator of unsettled 
questions of state law.”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Historically, this 
deferential attitude has been especially pronounced in the area of oil and gas law. See, e.g., 
Timothy Fitzgerald, Regulatory Obsolescence Through Technological Change in Oil and 
Gas Extraction, 43 WM. & M ARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 142-43 (2018) (“Regulation 
of oil and gas extraction activities has historically been the domain of states. . . . [And 
p]rimary regulatory oversight remains with the states.”). 
 114. Fisher v. Cont’l Res., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-097, 2015 WL 11400124 (D.N.D. Oct. 8, 
2015). 
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space.”115 Because Continental had yet to inject anything into its disposal 
well, the court dismissed the Fishers’ damages claim for “lost use and 
access to” the pore space before granting Continental’s motion for summary 
judgment as well as the Fishers’ partial motion for summary judgment.116 
In Mosser v. Denbury Resources, Inc.,117 the federal District Court of 
North Dakota denied defendant Denbury’s motion for summary judgment 
in another case for subsurface trespass and nuisance in which plaintiffs 
sought monetary damages for the conversion of an old well into a saltwater 
disposal well and for “the permanent occupancy of the pore space into 
which the salt water has been injected.”118 In that case, plaintiffs sought 
compensation for the use of their pore space, but the court declined to rule 
on that issue during the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.119 The 
court did, however, suggest that the plaintiffs “ha[d] stated plausible claims 
for trespass and nuisance relating to the pore space they . . . own”120 before 
concluding that “[t]he law and the facts related to th[e] case [we]re in need 
of development.”121 The law and the facts were further analyzed and 
subsequently adjudged in a subsequent order from the District Court of 
North Dakota.122 There, the court denied both the plaintiffs’ and the 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, but not before concluding: (1) 
that mineral operator had the right to dispose of waste in the underground 
pore spaces of its saltwater disposal well123; (2) that “surface owner’s land” 
includes pore space124; and (3) that surface owners may recover monetary 
damages for lost use of pore space beneath their lands.125 
Ultimately, this dispute was resolved by the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota after the District Court for the District of North Dakota certified 
seven questions for review to the state’s highest court.126 In that case, the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota confirmed the federal magistrate judge’s 
inklings as to pore space ownership127 and lost land value.128 The court then 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at *5. 
 116. Id. at *5-6. 
 117. No. 1:13-cv-148, 2014 WL 11531329 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2014). 
 118. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. at *2. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at *4. 
 122. Mosser v. Denbury Res., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 906 (D.N.D. 2015). 
 123. Id. at 913. 
 124. Id. at 922-23. 
 125. Id. at 933. 
 126. Mosser v. Denbury Res., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 406, 408 (N.D. 2017). 
 127. Id. at 412. 
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went on to answer other important questions, including “whether plaintiffs 
can recover damages . . . based only on evidence of what others are paying 
surface owners for the disposal of saltwater”—they can—and “whether 
plaintiffs can also recover for pore space that . . . has not [been] utilized”—
they can’t.129 Although each of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s answers 
to the certified questions in this dispute is important, more important for 
this Article is the noticeable absence of any substantive discussion of waste 
prevention or the protection of correlative rights.  
That said, this Article does not endorse the use of “waste prevention” and 
“correlative rights” as linguistic talismans to resolve (or initiate) oil and gas 
disputes; but in a state like North Dakota, complex oil and gas issues, like 
pore space law, cannot be appropriately analyzed without an honest 
appraisal of its impact on waste prevention and the protection of correlative 
rights. In the context of pore space law, both waste prevention and the 
protection of correlative rights are implicated. North Dakota has codified its 
commitment to the prevention of waste. While not dispositive, such a 
commitment means regulators, legislators, and judges evaluating pore space 
laws can—indeed should—do so with an eye towards waste prevention.  
In cases like Fisher and Mosser, in other words, the courts’ denial of the 
operators’ right to use the pore space within its unit would have been 
tantamount to waste because the operators would have had to incur 
additional costs (i.e., economic waste) to transport their saltwater and 
dispose of it elsewhere. Although correlative rights are really about 
protecting mineral owners’ rights to produce oil and gas, there is an 
analogue worth exploring in the protection of surface owners’ pore spaces. 
The courts in Fisher and Mosser resolved these disputes without explicit 
reference to waste prevention and correlative rights, which was their right, 
but next time they should integrate discussion of these principles with their 
other justifications. 
B. Gas Flaring 
Years ago,” writes oil and gas professor Monika Ehrman, “there was 
only darkness on the North Dakota plains.”130 However, today’s North 
Dakota plains are filled with anything but darkness.131 Escalating oil and 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at 415. 
 129. Id. at 416-17. 
 130. Ehrman, supra note 33, at 550. 
 131. E.g., Robert Krulwich, A Mysterious Patch of Light Shows Up in the North Dakota 
Dark, NPR (Jan. 16, 2013, 1:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2013/01/16/ 
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gas activities—born of a technological revolution132 and (relatively) high 
commodity prices133—have led to an increase in more than oil and gas 
production in North Dakota. Indeed, along with the increases in production 
have come increased state tax and royalty revenues134 and environmental 
concerns, like the emission of methane and carbon dioxide.135 However, 
atop the list of “increases” associated with the escalation of oil and gas 
activity in North Dakota is the ongoing practice of gas flaring.  
Gas flaring—or “the controlled combustion of gaseous compounds”136—
enables operators to dispose of excess natural gas from oil and gas wells by 
channeling it “up through flare stacks, where [it is] then ignited and 
combusted.”137 Flaring is, in other words, “a means of disposal used when 
there is no way to transport the gas to market and the operator cannot use 
the gas for another purpose.”138 Although flaring often occurs at several 
places in the upstream, midstream, and downstream sectors of the industry, 
the overwhelming majority of flaring in North Dakota happens upstream, 
during exploration and production. Flaring in the upstream sector typically 
occurs for one of two reasons: either “(1) during the completion process to 
control pressure during the ‘flowback’ stage following a hydraulic 
fracturing operation or (2) when production begins, but before a pipeline 
connection exists to transport the natural gas to market.”139  
North Dakota’s flaring phenomenon is attributable to: (1) the geologic 
composition of the Williston Basin (and the Bakken shale formation in 
                                                                                                                 
a-mysterious-patch-of-light-shows-up-in-the-north-dakota-dark (documenting NASA 
“nighttime tour” satellite images showing “the Dakota fields blazing”). But see Dustin 
Monke, Study: Bakken Natural Gas Flare Satellite Images Aren’t Accurate, BISMARCK 
TRIBUNE (June 10, 2015), https://bismarcktribune.com/bakken/study-bakken-natural-gas-
flare-satellite-images-aren-t-accurate/article_8528d1ab-b876-5c7c-9f9a-3d9189873261.html 
(citing University of North Dakota Energy & Environmental Research Center study calling 
satellite images “highly processed” and “inaccurate”). 
 132. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 133. E.g., Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=M. 
 134. See, e.g., Tax Revenues, ENERGY OF N.D., https://energyofnorthdakota .com/home-
menu/bakken-benefits/tax-revenues/ (reporting that during FY 2017 the State of North 
Dakota collected more than $1.63 billion in oil and gas production and extraction taxes—
accounting for 45.1% of all collected taxes—plus an additional $192.9 million in state 
royalties and $8.6 million in bonuses) (last accessed Aug. 9, 2019). 
 135. Ehrman, supra note 33, at 551. 
 136. Id. at 558. 
 137. Id. at 551. For a technical explanation of flaring, see id. at 558-59. 
 138. Id. at 558. 
 139. Id. 
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particular); (2) the nature of the produced gas; and (3) the general lack of 
takeaway infrastructure. Unlike many shale wells, “Bakken oil wells do not 
release large amounts of natural gas during flowback.”140 Instead, most of 
the gas that contributes to the need for flaring is “associated gas,” or gas 
produced in association with crude oil.141 Like the escaping of carbon 
dioxide from a can of freshly opened soda, so associated gas comes out of a 
reservoir as the pressure decreases.142 Associated gas, like the oil, water, 
and other fluids produced up the wellbore during production, requires 
proper management. In North Dakota, though, unlike in many of the states 
with histories of sustained petroleum production, there is a serious shortage 
of pipeline and processing infrastructure. These infrastructure shortages 
have contributed to North Dakota’s being labeled the “exemplar of a rural 
resource boom distant from existing infrastructure.”143 
Nevertheless, gas flaring has fallen sharply since the shale revolution 
first made it economically and technologically feasible to bring Bakken oil 
wells online. Notwithstanding an overall downward trend, a significant 
amount of gas continues to be flared.144 Other than the obvious 
infrastructure and economic constraints, why North Dakota operators 
continue to flare so much gas largely remains a mystery because the 
reduction of flaring is ostensibly an effort behind which industry, 
government, and environmentalists could get. Even so, little meaningful 
progress has been made, despite several stakeholders’ suggestions that there 
is a desire to solve the problem.145 Some observers argue that a “perfect 
storm,” including “long delays in permitting, labor shortages, and a short 
construction season,” has prevented any significant progress.146  
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. at 563-64, 564 n.114 (suggesting that perhaps as little as one percent (1%) of 
North Dakota’s flared gas is flowback gas.). 
 141. Id. at 564. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Fitzgerald, supra note 112, at 165. 
 144. E.g., North Dakota Drillers Flaring Up to 20% of Monthly Natural Gas Production, 
INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (May 28, 2019), http://ieefa.org/north-dakota-
drillers-flaring-up-to-20-of-monthly-natural-gas-production/; Natural Gas Flaring in North 
Dakota Has Declined Sharply Since 2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 13, 2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26632; Over One-Third of Natural Gas 
Produced in North Dakota is Flared or Otherwise Not Marketed, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Nov. 23, 2011), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4030. 
 145. See Associated Gas Flaring Fact Sheet, UNIV. OF N.D. ENERGY & ENVTL. RES. CTR., 
(2013), https://undeerc.org/bakken/pdfs/NDIC-NDPC-Flaring-Fact-Sheet.pdf (“There is a 
strong desire by all stakeholders to see this resource captured and to reduce gas flaring.”). 
 146. Ehrman, supra note 33, at 565. 
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But hope is not lost on everyone, including Bakken Midstream, a “new 
player” in the region. During the summer of 2019, Bakken Midstream 
announced plans to “reduce natural gas flaring by laying the groundwork 
for a new industry” in North Dakota.147 Although Bakken claims it has the 
financial capacity to deliver outside investment to the tune of hundreds of 
millions or perhaps billions of dollars, it has already secured a verbal 
commitment from North Dakota’s state government, which “said it would 
invest $200,000” with the new company. Given the amount of capital 
necessary to fund Bakken’s projects, the State’s $200,000 pledge is largely 
immaterial, although it does signal the state’s interest in helping to fix, or at 
least alleviate, North Dakota’s flaring problem.148 As controversy and 
investment in resolving the State’s flaring problem increase, gas flaring 
disputes inevitably will be drawn into the public spotlight via litigation 
before North Dakota courts. 
Stakeholders should keep an eye on how the North Dakota courts resolve 
gas flaring disputes because to date almost all of the debates about gas 
flaring have taken place on the floor of the State Capitol or within state and 
federal administrative agencies, like the NDIC and the Bureau of Land 
Management.149 Although those debates have included more talk of waste 
prevention and correlative rights than the cases on pore space law, there is 
little indication that these foundational principles are playing a leading role. 
If they were, North Dakota’s decade-old gas flaring problem might already 
be resolved. This is not to deny the complexity of the problem; after all, a 
real and lasting solution depends on the cooperation of regulators, industry 
advocates, and environmentalists, not to mention the construction of 
hundreds of millions of dollars of takeaway and processing infrastructure. 
On whom agencies like the NDIC can apply pressure isn’t clear either, 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Amy Dalrymple, Bakken Midstream Seeks ‘Fundamental Change’ for North Dakota 
Natural Gas Industry, WILLISTON HERALD (June 4, 2019), https://www.willistonherald.com/ 
news/oil_and_energy/bakken-midstream-seeks-fundamental-change-for-north-dakota-
natural-gas/article_6b058192-8718-11e9-9871-3f93e041e0ef.html. 
 148. Todd Epp, North Dakota Makes Small Bet on Natural Gas Infrastructure Company, 
KELO (June 13, 2019),, https://kelo.com/news/articles/2019/jun/13/north-dakota-makes-
small-bet-on-natural-gas-infrastructure-company/. 
 149. E.g., Amy Dalrymple, North Dakota Senate Defeats Bill to Study Natural Gas 
Flaring, BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Feb. 13, 2019), https:// bismarcktribune.com/bakken/north-
dakota-senate-defeats-bill-to-study-natural-gas-flaring/article_d301e841-ad9a-54fb-b4a3-
daaa6c118602.html; Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource 
Conservation; Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,184 through 
49,214 (Sept. 9, 2018) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). But see Langved v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 
899 N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 2017); Vogel v. Marathon Oil Co., 879 N.W.2d 471 (N.D. 2016). 
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however. If the NDIC attempts to curb flaring by restricting oil and gas 
production, state coffers will lose critical tax revenues and investment 
dollars will move elsewhere. But the waste of oil and gas in North Dakota 
is nevertheless prohibited by law which, in theory, means regulatory bodies 
like the NDIC ought to be able to flex their administrative muscle to force 
stakeholders’ hands. Despite its broad and continuing jurisdiction, the 
NDIC has been unable—or unwilling—to do so. 
C. Gas Royalties & the Marketable Product Rule 
A royalty interest is commonly defined as a “cost-free share of 
production”150 and usually is what “the lessee . . . agrees to pay the 
lessor . . . on any oil or gas that the lessee may produce from the lease.”151 
That definition may read rather easily, but courts have struggled to identity 
what exactly constitutes a royalty interest—especially lately. Of particular 
difficulty for courts has been “at the well” language, which is not only 
language common to oil and gas leases but has been historically (relatively) 
easy to interpret, at least until the 1960s.152 In 1964, the tide began to turn 
after the State of Kansas’ high court concluded in two royalty cases that the 
“lessee[s] improperly deducted [] compression costs.”153 As this is not an 
Article on gas royalties per se, suffice it say that the Supreme Court of 
Kansas’ holdings—essentially that an oil and gas lease’s “implied covenant 
to market required the lessee to bear all of the compression costs ‘necessary 
to make the gas marketable’”154—complicated oil and gas lease 
interpretation and led to the adoption of the “judicially crafted” Marketable 
Product Rules (“MPR”) in Oklahoma, Colorado, and West Virginia within 
a few decades’ time.155 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Royalty Interest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A share of 
production—or the value or proceeds of production, free of the costs of production—when 
and if there is production.”). 
 151. Bryon C. Keeling, In the New Era of Oil and Gas Royalty Accounting: Drafting a 
Royalty Clause that Actually Says What the Parties Intend It to Mean, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 
516, 518 (2017). 
 152. See John W. Broomes, Waste Not, Want Not: The Marketable Product Rule Violates 
Public Policy Against Waste of Natural Gas Resources, 63 KAN. L. REV. 149, 150 (2014). 
 153. Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product 
Doctrine: Just What Is the “Product”?, 37 ST. M ARY’S L.J. 1, 54 (2005). 
 154. Id. at 54-55. 
 155. Broomes, supra note 152, at 149. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 153, at 79-80 
(“The first marketable product doctrine has thrown oil and gas royalty law into chaos. Four 
different states have emerged with four different versions of the first marketable product 
doctrine . . . .”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss3/3
2020] Oil and Gas Conservation Law & the NDIC 455 
 
 
The MPR “requires the lessee under an oil and gas lease to bear all 
production and post-production expenses incurred until the gas is 
considered ‘marketable.’ Often, the result is a massive shifting of post-
production costs from lessors to lessees, as compared to the application of 
the same lease language in non-[MPR] jurisdictions.”156 Analysis of, and 
the justifications for, the MPR by courts can fairly be described as 
divergent, even contradictory.157 As one commentator noted, “[t]here are 
significant differences in some of the marketable-product rules, particularly 
the allowance of certain deductions under the federal and some state 
rules.”158 Put simply, there is no unanimous voice or ruling authority on 
what the MPR is or what exactly it means for lessors and lessees, which 
probably explains why most oil and gas producing states, including North 
Dakota, have refused to adopt the MPR.159  
North Dakota took its position on the MPR ten years ago, when the 
State’s highest court decided Bice v. Petro-Hunt, LLC.160 In Bice, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court rejected the MPR and opted instead for “the 
position favored by lessees, joining jurisdictions that let lessees reduce 
royalty payments by the cost of making oil and gas marketable.”161 
Although the court’s rejection of the MPR was clear, at least one 
commentator—John McArthur—has argued that the court’s reasoning was 
flawed, writing “that the rejection of a [MPR] in Bice was based on 
understandable but nonetheless real and demonstrable mistakes.”162 There is 
a latent but discernible preference for lessors in McArthur’s analysis which 
slightly impinges his credibility.163 Even so, McArthur makes a compelling 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Broomes, supra note 152, at 149. 
 157. For an analysis of Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, and West Virginia case law on the 
birth and growth of MPR jurisprudence, see id. at 153-74; see also McArthur, supra note 
112, at 566-67. 
 158. See McArthur, supra note 113, at 561. 
 159. See id. at 545 (“The marketable-product issue remains contested in many [] states. 
Indeed, it has split oilfield jurisdictions into two irreconcilable camps.”). 
 160. 768 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 2009). 
 161. McArthur, supra note 113, at 545; cf. Bice, 768 N.W.2d at 502. 
 162. McArthur, supra note 113, at 545, 549-72. 
 163. See, e.g., id. at 574-77 (“Lessees, of course, should minimize costs, and thus 
maximize profits, wherever they legally can. But taking steps to gain economies of scale for 
their own savings should not make formerly nondeductible costs suddenly deductible. . . . 
Lessees will argue that paying the royalty share imposes too many costs on them. In 
considering this argument, one fact to balance is that the lessee already receives the lion’s 
share . . . . Such higher shares compensate for the lessee’s added costs, including all drilling 
costs and other costs incurred to satisfy its cluster of duties, including the duty to market. . . .  
The lessee’s greater revenue interest does not itself prove that it should bear all costs, but it 
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and balanced plea to North Dakota’s high court should “deductions come 
around again”: 
If the North Dakota Supreme Court does again face the 
marketable-product issue, it will be in a better position to 
articulate a proper rule—one way or another—when it has a 
record before it. The record should contain evidence about what 
“at the well means,” how the field was developed, where gas is 
sold today compared to in the earlier regulated market, whether 
the field was developed primarily to serve distant demand or 
local demand, and whether prices that purportedly reflect local 
“markets” are true economic prices at all.164 
As providence would have it, McArthur was right: deductions came 
around again. In Newfield Exploration Co. v. State, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court got its chance to revisit the MPR and its holding in Bice.165 
In that case, Newfield initiated litigation hoping for a court ruling that 
would vindicate its position—that an audit by the State’s Department of 
Trust Lands, which had concluded Newfield underpaid royalties, was based 
upon faulty lease interpretation. Siding with the State-appellants, the high 
court reversed the district court ruling which had favored Newfield’s 
interpretation of several lease agreements between the producer and the 
State. In a short opinion that has implications for stakeholders across North 
Dakota, the court wrote, “Gross proceeds from which royalty payments 
under the leases are calculated may not be reduced by an amount that either 
directly or indirectly accounts for post-production costs incurred to make 
the gas marketable.”166  
Of particular note here, of course, is the fact that the court’s decision “is 
not a blanket ban prohibiting oil and gas companies from deducting for 
post-production costs; it’s specific to the state’s leases with Newfield.”167 
The North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in Newfield, in other words, 
does not affect the court’s holding in Bice; North Dakota has not adopted a 
                                                                                                                 
is a reminder that lessors have given very valuable consideration in order to have the lessee 
produce a marketable product and, even before considering deductions, only get a small part 
of the resulting revenue in return.”). 
 164. Id. at 572. 
 165. 2019 ND 193, 931 N.W.2d 478. 
 166. Id. ¶ 12, 931 N.W.2d at 481 (emphasis added). 
 167. Amy R. Sisk, ND Supreme Court Sides With State in Mineral Royalty Dispute, 
BISMARCK TRIBUNE (July 12, 2019), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-
regional/nd-supreme-court-sides-with-state-in-mineral-royalty-dispute/article_841e9c7e-
7df4-540c-92be-a6d522da11a1.html. 
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statewide MPR. Even so, the decision caught the attention of many 
stakeholders, including operator advocacy groups, many of which weighed 
in after the court handed down its decision. By way of example, North 
Dakota Petroleum Council President Ron Ness said this in response to 
Newfield: “Requiring an oil company to pay royalties on the end price of 
their product is like taxing a farmer on the price of bread rather than the 
price of wheat.”168 While the issue of gas royalties and the MPR remains 
unresolved in North Dakota, Newfield at least signals the a willingness to 
continue to hear gas royalty cases.  
Hopefully next time, the court is ready to analyze the dispute with an eye 
to North Dakota oil and gas conservation law and decades of precedent. 
After all, in states that have adopted the MPR, which “shift[s] [] post-
production costs to lessees, natural gas leases cease to produce in paying 
quantities earlier in their productive life, resulting in physical waste due to 
premature abandonment of otherwise recoverable natural gas reserves.”169 
To adopt the MPR, in other words, would be to adopt a rule that explicitly 
contradicts the state statute prohibiting the waste of oil and gas resources. 
Accordingly, North Dakota “courts should be particularly reluctant to 
embark on journeys to craft new doctrines, like the [MPR], that conflict 
with the legislature’s determination of public policy and frustrate the 
extraordinary efforts undertaken by the legislative body to achieve its 
policy goals.”170  
Furthermore, the MPR “essentially forces [] lessee[s] to be the guarantor 
of the physical properties of any natural gas discovered on the leased 
premises,”171 and that does not seem right. Instead, “[j]ust as a hard-rock 
miner is not expected to guarantee that every mineral deposit is gold, the oil 
and gas lessee should not have to warrant that all gas he discovers will be 
pipeline quality when it comes out of the ground.”172 However, that is 
exactly how states treat operators under the MPR. For advocates of oil and 
gas conservation law and the principles on which the industry was built, 
this ought not be so. In a word, whenever North Dakota’s high court gets a 
chance to revisit the MPR, it should remember that 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Suzanne Edwards, North Dakota Supreme Court Sides With State in Newfield 
Royalties Case, NATURAL GAS INTEL (July 17, 2019), https:// www.naturalgasintel.com/ 
articles/118985-north-dakota-supreme-court-sides-with-state-in-newfield-royalties-case. 
 169. Broomes, supra note 152, at 149-50. 
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the [MPR] reflects a paternalistic solution to a largely bygone 
era when landowners lacked ready access to legal expertise on 
oil and gas leasing. While the oil and gas industry has by no 
means been purged of its inherent self-interest, nor has it been 
immunized against sharp practices, the abundant availability of 
legal services to advise potential lessors . . . weighs heavily 
against the continued role of the courts as post-hoc advocates for 
the unwitting landowner.173 
Conclusion 
When regulators, lawmakers, and judges make, interpret, and apply new 
North Dakota oil and gas laws without an honest appraisal of their likely 
impacts on waste prevention and the protection of correlative rights, North 
Dakota oil and gas stakeholders—from surface and mineral owners to 
operators and the North Dakota citizenry writ large—suffer. To be sure, 
North Dakota’s status as one of the United States’ most prolific oil and gas 
producers is attributable to the sheer volume of sedimentary rock 
providentially deposited under the lands between its borders that today can 
be economically extracted from the ground. However, that is only part of 
the story. Indeed, North Dakota’s status as one of the country’s most 
prolific oil and gas producers is also attributable to its watchful 
conservation law and the foundational principles on which it stands. 
Regulators, lawmakers, and judges would be wise to remember these 
principles as they evaluate externalities and seek solutions to complex oil 
and gas law disputes. 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. at 186. 
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